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The $24 Trillion Derivatives Monster
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This is a story that bears repeating. J. P.
Morgan Chase & Co. (JPM-NYSE) is one of the biggest banks
in the world with assets of approaching US$ 700 billion, capital
of about US$ 41 billion and a market cap of US$ 71 billion.
By comparison Canada's largest bank the Royal Bank of Canada
(RY-TSE, NYSE has assets of about US$ 235 billion, equity
of about US$ 12 billion and a market cap of about US$ 26 billion.
J.P. Morgan Chase is roughly three times the size of Canada's
largest bank.
But there is an area where J.P. Morgan Chase
dwarfs the Royal Bank. Indeed J.P. Morgan Chase dwarfs everyone
in this business. The business is derivatives. In the USA
J. P. Morgan Chase is over 50% of the derivatives market.
According to figures from the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (OCC) as at December 31, 2001 JPM had notional
amounts of derivative contracts outstanding of US$ 23,520
billion or US$ 23.5 trillion. That was out of total derivatives
of reporting banks of US$ 45.4 trillion. The aforementioned
Royal Bank of Canada had at the end of their second quarter
a notional amount outstanding of approximately US$ 1.2 trillion.
Despite the huge notional outstandings at the
end of 2001 JPM was actually down from their peak that was
seen at the end of the second quarter 2001. At that time notional
amounts outstanding approached US$ 30 trillion. Since then
they have fallen an amazing US$ 7 trillion in only roughly
six months.
Part of it relates to the merger of the two
firms J.P. Morgan and Chase Manhattan that took place in 2001
as the US$ 30 trillion related to the combined firms pre merger.
We would surmise that part of it was due to netting and probably
derivatives transactions between the two banking institutions.
Still the outstanding figure is astounding. By comparison
the US GDP totals roughly US$ 10 trillion and total outstanding
debt of all sectors totals just over US$ 19 trillion.
The comparison of course is somewhat unfair
as the outstanding derivatives is notional amounts. Actual
exposure is measured by the net credit equivalent exposure.
As at December 31, 2001 the credit exposure for JPM according
to their annual report was US$ 51 billion. Again by comparison
the credit exposure for the Royal Bank of Canada was roughly
US$ 13 billion at the end of their second quarter April 30,
2002. These figures are allocations according to credit formulas.
In the event of a catastrophic unpredictable event the exposure
may be considerably larger. Derivative portfolios are subject
to a constant barrage of stress tests.
Derivatives are securities whose value depends
on the values of other basic underlying securities. Derivatives
have exploded in use over the past two decades. The include
such well known instruments as futures and options which are
actively traded on numerous exchanges and as well numerous
over-the-counter instruments such as interest rate swaps,
forward contracts in foreign exchange and interest rates,
and various commodity and equity derivatives. The worldwide
market is huge with an estimated size in excess of US$ 100
trillion. Everyone from the large financial institutions,
governments, corporations, mutual and pension funds, to hedge
funds, and large and small speculators, use derivatives. Many
individual investors may also use them even if all they are
doing is using them to write covered calls against their investments
on the advice of their stockbroker.
The huge derivatives exposure at JPM has been
the subject of a number of articles over the past few months.
First its sheer size is enough to catch anyone's attention
and secondly when one puts it beside the number of collapses
over the past several months it seemed that every time one
occurred JPM was at or near the top of the list of credit
holders. Enron, Global Crossing, Kmart, Argentina were all
amongst JPM's holdings that went down. JPM have said that
so far all of the high profile collapses are only about 1%
of its total portfolio. Still it is a concern.
But when it comes to derivatives it brings up
visions of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) the hedge fund
that collapsed in 1998 and that required a bail out from the
Federal Reserve and a cadre of banks including JPM; and, Nick
Leeson, the derivatives trader that brought down Barings Bank
PLC in 1995; and, the Orange County, California collapse in
1994. Indeed derivative collapses have been behind numerous
stories over the past decade. The most recent was the collapse
of Enron where the energy giant was hiding transactions in
subsidiaries using derivatives. As well stories have come
to light about significant manipulations in energy derivatives
by Enron that had a negative impact on energy prices during
the California energy blackouts.
But JPM as a subject of articles has put it
in the category of "too big to fail" (Is J.P. Morgan
Chase too big to fail? John Crudele, New York Post, February
7, 2002). Jim Grant's Interest Rate Observer termed JPM's
derivative position as so huge it looks like a typographical
error. The next largest exposure is with Bank of America at
US$ 9.3 trillion outstanding. So the almost US$ 24 trillion
at JPM does look like a monster.
One of the more curious exposures is gold derivatives.
JPM has been the subject of considerable scrutiny by the Gold
Anti-Trust Committee (GATA) as one of the chief culprits behind
the alleged gold manipulation. JPM certainly does have large
outstandings in gold derivatives. According to figures from
OCC JPM had over US$ 41 billion of gold derivatives as at
December 31, 2001. This represented almost 65% of all the
gold derivatives held by US banks. It also represents the
equivalent of 149 million ounces of gold assuming the closing
price of gold on December 31, 2001 at US$ 279. Of course what
we don't know is the net exposure position as the figures
are only the gross outstandings. And we don't know whether
their position is long or short gold and how it might relate
to physical holdings. Still it did represent a drop of US$
14.8 billion or 26.5% from the outstandings at the end of
the second quarter. Quite a drop.
JPM has been referred to as a house of cards
because of the huge outstandings in derivatives. But of course
we only know the gross position and not the net position that
may be offset with physical holdings in bonds, loans, equity
and gold. The vast majority of the positions are termed in
JPM's annual report as trading positions as opposed to hedging
positions. That could mean almost anything although oddly
enough in twenty plus years in the investment industry many
of them spent as a derivatives trader, trading positions meant
speculative leveraged positions.
The so-called rogue trader Nick Leeson who made
a huge derivatives bet on the direction of the Japanese Nikkei
Dow brought on the aforementioned collapse of Barings Bank
PLC. The collapse of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM),
a hedge fund that had a former derivatives and bond dealer
from Salomon Brothers and two Nobel Prize winners in Economics
as principals, collapsed because of huge leveraged bets in
currencies and bonds. Finally a lot of the problems of Enron
were brought on by leveraged derivatives and using derivatives
to hide problems on the balance sheet. Annual reports say
nothing about the leveraged positions of JPM.
More questions have come to JPM since the supposed
mysterious leaving of Dinsa Mehta, JPM's former head of global
commodity risk management and global foreign exchange. Mr.
Mehta had been with JPM for 26 years. One of his responsibilities
was JPM's gold portfolio. Rumours had persisted that there
was something wrong in their precious metals book. After the
financial debacles of Enron, Global Crossing and Argentina
all we can say is that the "House of Morgan" is
still around. As for Mehta all he says is that "Conspiracy
theorists are doing what they do best; provide entertainment
from the sidelines". JPM is being sued in conjunction
with lawsuits brought against Enron and Mr. Mehta has been
named along with others to appear and provide documentation
on matters related to Enron to the House Committee on Energy
and Commerce.
We leave you with a chart of J.P. Morgan Chase
& Co. and the Philadelphia Gold & Silver Index (XAU)
two charts going in opposite directions. JPM is a key component
of the Dow Jones Industrials. The gold sector has been the
best performing sector over the past year. Where there is
smoke, there could be fire. As gold goes up is there a debacle
in waiting sitting in their gold derivatives portfolio? Or
for that matter in their interest rate derivatives portfolio
as interest rates are pressured if the US Dollar continues
its current fall? We would keep a close eye on JPM.

Note: Chart produced using Omega TradeStation. Chart data
supplied by Dial Data.
David Chapman
www.davidchapman.com
June 12, 2002
Charts and technical commentary by David Chapman
of Union Securities Ltd. 69 Yonge Street, Suite 600, Toronto,
Ontario, M5E 1K3 (416) 604-0533, (416) 604-0557 (fax) 1-888-298-7405
(toll free)
email david@davidchapman.com
***********************************************
The
opinions, estimates and projections stated are those of David
Chapman as of the date hereof and are subject to change without
notice. David Chapman, as a registered representative of Union
Securities Ltd. makes every effort to ensure that the contents
have been compiled or derived from sources believed reliable
and contain information and opinions, which are accurate and
complete. Neither David Chapman nor Union Securities Ltd.
take responsibility for errors or omissions which may be contained
therein, nor accept responsibility for losses arising from
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the information nor any opinion expressed constitutes a solicitation
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