Time for a 'Golden parachute'

"…If my people, who are called by my name, Will humble themselves and pray and seek my face And turn from their wicked ways, Then I will hear from heaven and will forgive their sin, And will heal their land." 2 Chronicles chapter 7, verses 13 & 14

SUMMARY

It is ironic to reflect that the man who penned: 'Gold and Economic Freedom' as an article of monetary faith in 1966, should find himself presiding over the 'nerve centre' of the FIAT money system - particularly at a time when the nation's economic freedom is on brink of being severely curtailed by circumstance.

The clearest evidence of the US flying on empty is the accelerating slide of the dollar. The underlying cause has been the nation's relentless pursuit of monetary and credit policies in direct opposition to those its Fed Chairman so boldly espoused in his original article of 1966. The tragedy is that responsibility for the coming crisis lies largely with the Chairman himself, due to errors of policy committed under his watch. One cannot escape the fact that he has been steering the US engine of debt for 17 years, ever since August 11, 1987.

This report attempts to analyze the state of the US economy. It presents some conventional forecasts - based on past experience - as to what could happen if events proceed unchecked. It considers the two most likely scenarios of depression and hyper-inflation, depending on the strategies chosen. Finally, it proffers a radical third alternative, one which ought to be far less painful than going down the road of depression but simultaneously has the ability to avoid the currency destruction implicit in the hyper-inflation option. It lays a foundation for gradually returning to financial discipline, balanced budgets, and sound money - but in ways which retain the dollar's role as major 'reserve currency'.

Implementation needs to be rapid to halt the accelerating process of destruction already underway - a process which will otherwise dethrone the dollar, forfeiting its role to a politically unstable EURO ruled by increasingly 'godless' Europeans. A group of erstwhile Christian nations that can exclude a man from office because of his expression of Christian faith in action - his opposition to 'gay' marriage - can never be trusted to sustain a sound monetary unit requiring strict adherence to a code of mutually agreed principles. European Union commitment to the Maastricht Treaty espousing financial discipline is already honoured only in the breach by the EU's dominant members, France, Germany and Italy. It goes to show that when push comes to shove, Europe has no respect for principle - neither in morals nor in finance. Those who believe the EURO can fulfill its role as a reliable store of value for any length of time are in for a disappointment. Investors will be jumping from the frying pan into the fire. The rate can probably rise from $1,34 to $1,80 over the next 18 months but long before those levels are reached the European Central Bank will be printing EURO's for all they are worth, in an attempt to stem the tide.

The course of action we propose requires a bold unilateral step of faith from President Bush - in terms of restoring the dollar's role as a long term stable store of value. To take the step, Bush will need to draw on the unique experience of Alan Greenspan. The Fed Chief will have to dump his long love affair with FIAT money and return to the beliefs and principles of his youth. Without such a move, prospects for US markets look bleak, as does the outlook for the standard of living of the average American.

Only a Bush could do what is proposed. Only a Greenspan could help him do it. Bush has the moral courage to act. Greenspan has the experience to implement. What we propose is the re-introduction of a working Gold Standard. The keys are METHOD and PRICE. We discuss them in our conclusion. The main body of the report will demonstrate that no other solution can work without incurring untold global economic damage and leaving America vulnerable to the accusation of having acted dishonestly towards her creditors. There is a better way for the US to pay her debts.

1. Greenspan's reputation in the balance

Despite the eulogies of politicians who don't understand what Greenspan has done, there are some in the financial world who do. Their assessment of the Fed chief's overall performance since 1987 has been far less flattering. In the words of critic Doug Henwood, Editor of Left Business Observer:

"He has lurched from crisis to crisis - I don't know who could have been worse. He turned McChesney-Martin's dictum around. Instead of taking the punch bowl away, Greenspan was SPIKING it."

Henwood concludes with a comment on Greenspan's easy-money policies:

"…a recipe for future disaster- … hard to deflate a bubble gently"

In his latest fortnightly economic tour de force, The Privateer's Bill Buckler was even less restrained. What led up to his scathing attack was the way in which Greenspan unburdened himself in an address to bankers in Frankfurt on November 19, prior to the start of the recent G20 meeting in Berlin. First look at what Greenspan himself said:

"It seems persuasive that, given the size of the US current account deficit, a DIMINISHED APPETITE for adding to US Dollar balances must occur at some point….International investors will eventually ADJUST their accumulation of Dollar assets or, alternatively, seek HIGHER Dollar returns to offset…risk, elevating the COST of financing the US current account deficit and rendering it increasingly less tenable."

The Privateer commented as follows:

"Greenspan has now joined the chorus of concern…that … US current account deficits are simply unviable. But current account deficits don't just happen, they are CAUSED. They are …caused by artificially lowered internal rates of interest which generate in their turn much higher rates of …borrowing and …debts. Then, as this new stream of BORROWED PURCHASING POWER joins …existing quantities of cash and deposits in banks, it leads to increased CONSUMPTION followed by climbing …IMPORTS. The trade balance swings into deficit, followed by ….EXTERNAL DEBTS …piling …ever higher."

"The wonder of it all is that …Greenspan now stands forth in Frankfurt and …identifies the assured OUTCOME of precisely the monetary and credit policies which he himself has been the initiator and sustainer of for so long!"

"How ….Greenspan will be greeted ….when he returns to the USA is anybody's guess."

"If there is… justice - then based on Patriot Acts 1 and 11 - he ought to be arrested …as a financial terrorist."

"Greenspan has, by deceit, placed the US in a position where the credit expansions he …originated have left the US exposed to a "debt maelstrom" which can arrive…anytime the rest of the world…decides not to lend."

Having deserted the discipline of his first love, gold, for the deceptive allure of serving the monied elite, the Fed Chairman can learn from Shakespeare. It may help him understand the cause of his current difficulties:

"He who sups with the devil must needs have a long spoon."

Greenspan deliberately befriended the Bankers. He exchanged his belief in sound money for a key role in extending the tentacles of their fraudulent FIAT money system. In fact he once boasted:

"I look forward to being Fed Chairman and printing my way out of the next Kondratieff winter."

His wish was granted. He was appointed to the position on August 11, 1987. What followed two months later was not his fault, he inherited it, but the way he dealt with it set a pattern which has given us the mess we find ourselves in today. On October 19, a date that subsequently became known as 'Black Monday', the Dow fell 22%. This was the greatest loss Wall Street had ever suffered in a single day. There were two acknowledged causes:

One was legislation which passed the House Ways & Means Committee on October 15, 1987, eliminating the deductibility of interest on debt used for corporate takeovers. The offending provision was later removed.

The other - which brings us closer to the events of last week - was the announcement of a large trade deficit on October 14, 1987, which led Treasury Secretary James Baker to suggest the need for a FALL in the dollar on foreign exchange markets. Fears of a lower dollar led foreigners to pull out of dollar-denominated assets, causing a sharp rise in interest rates, which in turn hammered stock prices.

2. Greenspan and the crash of '87

It is not the specific CAUSES of each crisis which concern us so much as the countervailing measures adopted by the Fed under the guiding hand of Greenspan and his predecessors. What makes our discussion controversial is that on each and every occasion when the Fed has intervened - both before '87 and since - most of those in politics or the financial world have only had praise for the successful strategies repeatedly adopted to prevent financial melt-downs. A particular case in point was Greenspan's rapid re-liquification of the financial markets in the days following the crash of '87. His actions were so successful that within 24 months markets had completely recovered. It is however the cumulative long term costs of each and every intervention which plagues us today as the required 'fix' balloons.

3. US Flying on empty

Collective central bank interventions, like the Plaza Accord of 1985, have had very mixed benefits and we discuss them in detail. It is necessary to still the growing clamour for yet another joint agreement, leading to yet another devaluation of the dollar. The most powerful advocate of this strategy has cleverly - and only very recently - been Greenspan himself as he openly PREDICTED what he wanted to see happen. His co-conspirator was - and still is - President Bush, as he unrepentantly pursues the 'borrow and spend' policies he and his administration devised to counter the crash of 2001.

We strongly disagree with the strategies both of them colluded to implement, but the flaws only become apparent when the results of Fed intervention are studied collectively, in retrospect, and over an extended period of time. By doing this, can we count the true cost of intervention. It will help us allocate responsibility for the problems the US faces today. It may assist us in suggesting a way out of the current economic impasse. What is undeniable is that the US economy is maxed out and flying on empty. All categories of debt have been pushed to the limit - internal, external, private and public. Thanks to the low interest strategies of the Fed, the US middle class has mortgaged itself to the hilt - either by 'trading up' or 'extracting equity'. In the process house prices have ratcheted to an unsustainable peak.

If the dollar slide gathers momentum it could conceivably lead to a panic collapse in the international value of the currency. US bond prices will eventually follow as foreign central bank support slowly wanes. Long term interest rates will then DOUBLE from 5% to 10%. Mortgage rates will move in step. The housing bubble will burst. Retail sales will fall off sharply. The US could face depression which will then spread to her trading partners as their biggest market wilts and shrinks to a shadow of its present size.

4. The FIAT alternative leads to hyperinflation

In the recent past concerted currency intervention by Asian central banks served to lend artificial support to both the dollar and US debt markets. We discussed this extensively in an earlier report we wrote on March 12, 2004, entitled:

"Currencies in 'FIAT Folly' - face Abyss of destruction."

(Subscribers are welcome to access all previous reports.)

In a recent article Bill Gross of PIMCO called the actions of Asian central banks a 'Faustian Bargain'. By artificially supporting the dollar and US bonds at the expense of their own currencies - printing Yen and other currencies to buy dollars - they were effectively subsidizing their exports to US markets. Without such intervention, American consumers would either buy something cheaper - or nothing at all. Asian central banks get left holding a swelling stock of increasingly worthless dollars, but down the line there is likely to be a more damaging and dangerous result.

Although the printing of Yen in small quantities inflicts minimal damage while Japan is experiencing deflation, large-scale printing would have dire consequences. In a fruitless and vain attempt to hold up the currency of a country far larger than hers, Japan would eventually jeopardize her long term bond market, causing prices to fall and yields to rise. This would create far greater damage in the banking and pension sectors, than a slide in the NIKKEI due to a slowing economy.

Yield on the 10 year Japanese Government Bond peaked at 9% in 1990, fell to half a percent in 2003, but has since risen to 1,45%. In so doing, it has broken a 14 year down trend line. This suggests that in the next few years Japanese bond yields could rebound sharply, in line with rising yields in the US. Ultimately they look to bounce right back up to their previous peak of 9%. That would decimate the asset values of Japanese bank stocks.

The above is an example of how sustained currency support operations by America's trading partners will simply transfer the American malaise to those countries that intervene. The end result will be the destruction of the FIAT money system through a spreading and accelerating process of inflation which finally goes 'hyper'.

5. Facing the pain of reality

The South African Sunday Times of November 28, carried an article on the US economy headed:

"When the US sneezes, the rest of the world catches a cold."

It contained a quote from Scott Campbell of Optimal Fund Management:

"The US dollar can tank to smithereens and the current account problem will not disappear. The twin deficits in the US - budget and trade - are a consequence of living beyond one's means for some time, and the only way to fix the problem is through some belt tightening. The US economy badly needs a RECESSION to reduce import demand, and bring consumer credit back into line."

Most recent figures indicate a trade deficit running at $665billion a year, equivalent to 6% of GDP. The budget deficit is running at an annualized rate of almost the same - $630billion - equivalent to 5,7% of GDP. Ruthlessly trimming the budget deficit would go a long way to curbing the trade deficit, without dramatically trashing the dollar. However, if budget pain is not on the table for discussion, the dollar is being set up for a major fall.

6. Refusing to face the pain

Greenspan and Bush currently have a totally different strategy from Scott-Campbell's. Although Greenspan admits it is important that BOTH deficits be cut, conceding that cutting the budget deficit would help reduce the trade deficit, he went on to warn that:

"Inducing recession to suppress consumption would not be constructive."

In sympathy with this attitude, and a day prior to Greenspan's routing of the dollar on November 19, the US Congress aligned itself with the Fed Chief's 'soft option' approach, by RAISING the federal debt limit $800billion to $8,18trillion, thereby automatically REJECTING restrictions on both tax cuts and spending,

Economist Robert Brusca of the UN's FAO Economics division saw right through Greenspan's DOUBLETALK. He said Greenspan is NOT warning about the consequences of a weak dollar - to the contrary:

"If anything Greenspan is afraid that the dollar will not get WEAK ENOUGH, and as a result the US current account deficit could stay too large for too long…while Greenspan voiced support for closing the budget deficit, it's really the CURRENT ACCOUNT deficit that worries him more. And one way to close the current account deficit is to see the DOLLAR DROP even further compared to other major currencies."

Brusca went on:

"A call to shrink the US current account deficit - as long as we conclude it is NOT a call for RECESSION in the US - is also a call for STRONGER GROWTH abroad AND for a weaker dollar."

In other words it places blame and the burden of change on America's trading partners - more so than on the US itself.

7. Why the strategy for a weaker dollar won't work

Following the PLAZA Accord of 1985, France, Germany, Japan and the UK agreed to assist the US to effect a substantial devaluation of the US dollar in order to bring the US trade deficit back under control. At that stage it was running at 3% of GDP. Over the next three years the dollar exchange rate declined by an average of 50% against the currencies of the countries in the Accord. By 1991, five years after the Accord, the trade deficit had been completely eliminated and replaced with a small surplus, but the unseen costs were substantial. Two years into the slide, the deflationary effects on world trade triggered the crash of '87. Two years later, despite a sharp and sustained bounce back in Western markets, the Japanese NIKKEI collapsed, forcing the nation into a 14 year recession from which it has yet to recover.

The position the US finds itself in today is more serious than 1985. On June 22 of this year, The Economist published an article entitled:

"How to slay America's monster trade gap"

The writer mentioned how hard it would be for the US to close the now MUCH HIGHER trade gap without causing substantial pain - not just to herself, but to her trading partners, most of whom would struggle to find alternative markets as US demand is curbed by the rising cost of imports. Because the American market is so dominant, its loss implies a substantial drop in overall sales for trading partners whose currencies appreciate. The deflationary impact of these influences will in turn have a knock-on effect on the US, making it difficult for the latter to maintain exports - let alone increase them.

The article referred to a study by economists at the OECD who reckon that to narrow the deficit by TWO percentage points by the end of the decade - six years out - will require the dollar to LOSE 25% of its current value by the end of 2004. The article was written in June. Since then the dollar index has fallen 7,8% and the EURO 10,2% - still nowhere near sufficient to turn the situation around. Even so, the OECD prescription only looks to trim the deficit by 2% of GDP. The problem is that latest figures place the deficit closer to 6%, if the latest quarterly figure of $166 billion is annualized to $664,8 billion.

On October 28 the Economist followed up its June 22 article with an update entitled:

"The Wolf at the door"

After interviewing Stephen Roach, chief economist at Morgan Stanley, The Economist wrote the following:

"In the three years from 1985, the dollar fell by 50% against the other main currencies. Inflation and bond yields rose and, in October 1987, the stock market crashed. America's current-account deficit is now almost twice as big as it was then, so the total fall in the dollar - and the FALL-OUT in other financial markets - could well be larger. The WOLF is licking his lips."

In other words, a 50% devaluation is nowhere near ENOUGH, even given that it has already fallen almost 10%!

8. The problem of China

Official US policy repeatedly urges the need for a substantial REVALUATION of the Chinese Yuan in order to reduce ballooning Chinese exports to the US market. Some recommend a Yuan up-move of as much as 40%. Many US domestic manufacturing industries have been gutted by Chinese competition. Quite recently my wife went shopping for her grandchildren. Chinese 'Barbie Dolls' sell for less than 15% of the cost of an American 'original'. How can the US compete?

Understandably there is a groundswell of rising protectionism. Many US industries have re-located their plants to China to take advantage of labour rates which don't even bear talking about. Unfortunately a Yuan revaluation causes more problems than it solves.

First of all, China is running an OVERALL trade deficit, but admittedly not a large one. Although her surplus with the US constitutes between 20% and 25% of the US total of $665 billion, it gets dissipated financing imports of food, raw materials, metals and crude oil. In fact the Chinese economic miracle has been largely responsible for booming commodity prices despite a GDP which is only 3,5% of the world total.

While Americans may rue the rate at which Chinese increasingly swap bikes for motorized transport, thereby developing an insatiable thirst for oil, the flow-through benefit down the supply chain is substantial as third world exports of commodities take off skywards. They are beginning to enjoy a measure of economic blessing for the first time in 20 years - this is certainly true of South Africa, the continent's 'commodity treasure chest' - hence the strong Rand. The last thing they wish to see is the Chinese Tiger shot at dawn.

Secondly, the Chinese are reading their economic history books. The first PLAZA Accord, in 1985, ruined Japan and drove her into a 14 year deflationary recession. China needs similar treatment like a hole in the head. She still has 200m unemployed. They are being absorbed into the economy at a rate of 14m a year. She desperately needs a further decade of growth.

Thirdly, 65% of Chinese exports source from foreign-owned factories answering to shareholders in the US and Japan. To that extent, even marketing strategies are out of her ambit. China simply supplies cut price labour and an environment free of the health, pension, and insurance costs which burden manufacturers in the West. China's central bank Deputy Governor Li Rougo described the extent of the wage disparity as follows:

"The appreciation of the Yuan will not solve the problems of unemployment in the US because the cost of labour in China is only 3% that of US labour. They should give up textiles, shoe-making and even agriculture…. They should concentrate on sectors like aerospace ….sell those things to us …we would spend billions…. We could easily balance the trade."

The fourth problem with a Yuan revaluation is that for various reasons, 50% of Chinese loans are deemed shaky and worse. Raising interest rates or revaluing the Yuan could trigger widespread defaults in the banking sector. In the first instance debt-laden customers would finally sink under the weight of rising rates. In the second, a revaluation could spark a run on deposits as money flees the country.

In an article entitled:

"Follies of fiddling with the Yuan"

Henry C.K. Liu, Chairman of New York-based Liu Investment Group, put it this way:

"With every passing day more market watchers join the ranks of those predicting a looming crisis in the US financial system due to excessive debt, particularly external debt. This danger cannot possibly be defused by China, regardless of the monetary policy she adopts. The dismal record of Fed monetary policies which induced the crashes of 1987, 1994, 1997, and 2000, discounts the value of US advice for Chinese economic and monetary policy….China's growth has largely been led by GROWING processing and assembly operations in China for re-export, operated by TRANSNATIONAL corporations mainly to DEMOLISH the hard-won gains of labour movements in the capitalistic West."

As a passionate believer in free markets, my own comment would be:

"What is wrong with international investors locating plants where labour costs are lowest? When critics exercise the right to call for tenders for capital construction projects, they insist on keenest prices. Why can't investor's do the same in the area of labour costs?

Chinese Premier Wen bluntly told US Treasury Secretary John Snow that the dollar crisis is America' s problem, not China's. He could have added that America needs to start living within her means before trying to pass the buck and blame trading partners like China. Wen well knows that a sharp appreciation of the Yuan will drive China back into deflation.

More than a year ago, David O'Rear, Chief Economist of the Hong Kong Chamber of Commerce summed up calls for a Yuan revaluation as follows:

"If Japan's mature financial institutions and exporting corporations were devastated by the aftermath of the first PLAZA Accord, imagine what would happen to China's far less developed banks and other financial sector companies. The implications for Hong Kong are severe as well."

The 1999 economics Nobel laureate Robert Mundell attended a conference in Beijing this year. He said:

"Never before has there been a case where international monetary authorities have tried to pressure a country with an INCONVERTIBLE currency to appreciate its currency. China should NOT appreciate or devalue the Yuan in the foreseeable future. Appreciation or floating of the Yuan …would have important consequences for growth and STABILITY in China and Asia."

In concluding the section on China, we quote from a short article by Michael Darda, Chief Economist of Polyeconomics, an economic forecasting firm in New Jersey. It was headed:

"A Ruinous Dollar Policy"

"The Fed is fixated on the current account deficit. This has led them to imply the dollar should fall….Those advocating a weak dollar to redirect trade flows do not have history on their side. While a depreciating currency is assumed to boost exports and shut off demand for imports, this is only the FIRST EFFECT. Eventually a weak currency invites INFLATION, which neutralizes the effect of the lower exchange rate…..Persistent currency depreciation has NEVER brought lasting prosperity to any government in the history of the world. If the dollar continues to depreciate, it will bring higher inflation, higher interest rates, lower real growth rates, and a reduced standard of living for most wage earners."

Darda ended by urging Greenspan to focus his attention on his own area of responsibility, the creation of EXCESS supplies of money. This is Key number one. The second was pinpointed by author Richard Duncan in his book entitled:

'The Coming Dollar Crisis'

Duncan highlighted what he considered to be the greatest danger to the world economy - the curtailing of American demand for imports. He predicted that as the dollar crash proceeds, the US trade deficit will eventually shrink. If the bond market collapses simultaneously, the process could accelerate out of control. Americans will literally stop buying products from overseas. This will instantly remove a huge source of global demand from the world economic equation. UNLESS REPLACED, Duncan says we face the likelihood of an acute global depression. Unfortunately the SOLUTION he proposes comes from fairyland. He would have the international community pressure emerging market nations to raise wage rates by an average of 25%. He says this will give a balancing boost to world demand. Try telling that to the Chinese and Indians while their unemployed still number in the hundreds of millions! The strategy won't get off first base. The ultra low wages of workers in China and India will rise as and when the situation demands. Right now it does not. But we draw attention to Duncan's key phrase "UNLESS REPLACED". We will address it in our conclusion.

9. Biggest Danger for US market - crashing bonds, rising rates

Top US economist Fred Bergsten - a well-entrenched 'establishment' figure - forecast a 'financial quagmire' unless Bush took steps to tackle the deficit problem. But he never told him HOW to do it. All he did was repeat the warnings of others:

"A sharp US dollar fall is possible in the next six to twelve months, and US interest rates could go to DOUBLE DIGITS."

Until the Presidential election was out of the way, dollar and bond bears were confused and out-maneuvered by the stubborn refusal of bond prices to crack and rates on the 10 year and 30 year bonds to rise. Bill Gross of PIMCO gave the reason why their forecasts came to nothing. He said that until Japan and China began to lose their appetite for recycling dollar surpluses into the US bond market, the bigger the trade deficit became, the greater the degree of support for US bonds. In fact he maintained that Asian buying actually pushed rates DOWN.

Following Greenspan's bearish forecast on the dollar and US bond rates, there was an immediate and overwhelming market turnaround. Asian support began to fade and long term bond charts began to give clear SELL signals with rates breaking sharply upwards.

10. CONCLUSION

The conclusion of our analysis is simple and stark. Last time the US trade gap hit crisis point was in 1985 when it reached 3% of GDP. At that stage it required a 50% devaluation of the dollar over a three year period. This successfully but painfully brought the trade deficit back into small surplus after six years. The cost was heavy. It led to the crash of '87 and caused the collapse of the NIKKEI in '89. Today the trade deficit is pushing towards to an annualized rate of 6% - DOUBLE the crisis level reached in 1985. To make matters worse, 15% of total US imports come from China who is in turn responsible for 23% of the total US trade deficit of $650billion. They are refusing to be part of the adjustment process.

This means that those countries responsible for the remaining 85% of exports to the US are going to have to bear the total burden - but from a far wider deviation from the norm than the US encountered in 1985. Even a EURO rate of $2,00 would be insufficient, as would a Yen rate of 52. Yet the economic implications for both these countries would be catastrophic at the currency levels specified. They would drive them into depression. The average level of their exports to the US would have to fall by 50% if Chinese exports continue unabated.

They will be forced to find replacement markets or their own economies will be severely dented. We are talking about a diversion of $670billion of fresh buying, which has to come from somewhere. It simply isn't there.

Alternatively, there has to be a compensatory increase in US EXPORTS to these same trading partners and the rest of the world - but excluding China. Either way, the required swing of trade in favour of the US will suck $670billion of buying power out of the world economy. It will be highly deflationary. Somehow or other, there has to be a compensatory boost to international liquidity - preferably not by raising debt.

In his book 'The Coming Dollar Crisis' discussed at the end of section 8 above, Richard Duncan highlighted a further dimension to the loss of buying power. He predicted that as the dollar crash proceeds, it could trigger panic foreign selling of US bonds. The process could accelerate out of control if Americans literally stop buying products from overseas. The figure of $670billion could even be exceeded.

PART 2 of this report is headed:

"TIME FOR A GOLDEN PARACHUTE"

It describes a method by means of which the US could return the world to a working GOLD STANDARD. It suggests various price levels for the various STAGES and the hurdles which would have to be cleared in each case before one could proceed from one stage to the next. It also discusses the probability of each of the 3 scenarios - hyperinflation, dollar devaluation or golden parachute and the investor's response. Part 2 is only for SUBSCRIBERS.

We encourage you to access it at Peter George's website with a view to becoming a SUBSCRIBER. The address is:

www.investmentindicators.com

*****

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