IMF Gold Sales
February 04, 2005
The gold price has been weak of late, down ten dollars in
the past seven days. Thursday’s decline was blamed on remarks made
by the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, about a possible
revaluation of the International Monetary Fund’s gold reserves,
and the possibility that some of those reserves might be sold to provide
debt relief to poor countries.
The IMF has about one hundred million ounces of gold which
are valued on its books at between $40 and $50 an ounce. To keep the arithmetic
simple, let’s say the IMF has one hundred million ounces valued
at $40 an ounce. Revaluing that gold at $440 an ounce would instantaneously
create $40 billion dollars on the IMF’s balance sheet.
The $40 billion dollars so “created” can then
be used to offset some of the debt owed to the IMF by poor nations. Such
a revaluation and cancellation of debt does not necessarily involve the
sale of any gold -- it can be done with accounting entries.
Another possibility is that the IMF actually sells some,
or all of its gold, and uses the proceeds to assist poor countries with
their debt. If the IMF sold its gold it could, for instance, buy a basket
of sovereign debt and use the interest earned on the portfolio for debt
relief. This option could potentially be more detrimental to the gold
market. We are talking about a lot of gold: the IMF has 103.4 million
ounces, or 3,216 tonnes. If all that gold were dumped on the market at
once it could have a negative impact on the gold price. However, it is
highly unlikely that the IMF would do that.
It is far more likely that the IMF will use off-market transactions
to assist poor countries with high debt burdens, as it did with Brazil
and Mexico a few years ago when these countries’ debt payments to
the IMF were coming due. Between December 1999 and April 2000 the IMF
“sold” 12.9 million ounces of gold to Brazil and Mexico at
prevailing market prices and the profit on the sales (market price for
gold less approximately $40 an ounce) was placed in special accounts designated
for debt relief. Brazil and Mexico then immediately sold the same gold
back to the IMF, at the same price they paid for it, to settle their debt
payments that were coming due. The net effect was that the IMF still had
exactly the same amount of gold on its books. It’s not clear from
the IMF’s website how, exactly, Mexico and Brazil’s overall
debts were impacted. I assume that their debts were just re-financed in
the process, although some of the money created on the IMF’s balance
sheet by this revaluation of its gold reserves could have been used to
offset the total amount of outstanding debt as well. It is clear, however,
that the money created from the revaluation of the IMF’s gold is
being used to provide debt relief to poor, and heavily indebted countries.
Such off-market transactions are similar to a pure revaluation
of the IMF’s gold and do not involve any gold actually being sold
on the market. Since many of the same poor countries that the IMF is trying
to help are actually gold producers, and since in many cases these countries’
gold exports account for a large (sometimes very large) percentage of
their foreign currency receipts, off-market transactions are far more
palatable than actual gold sales.
If we assume that some of the IMF’s gold will hit
the market, then we have to consider what impact that will have. For instance,
if the IMF sells its gold over a period of five to ten years, the net
impact on the gold price should be negligible. In a previous commentary
(“Central Bank sales and the gold price”, December 5, 2003)
I showed that Central Bank gold sales did not affect the gold price during
the period from 1990 to 2003. During that time Central Banks sold roughly
5,500 tonnes of gold -- far more than the IMF has to sell -- and since
that did not negatively impact the gold market, I have no reason to believe
that IMF gold sales will negatively impact the market either.
The only impact that Central Bank sales did have on the
gold market during the 1990s was that they caused speculative selling
on the date of the announcement. But the announcements were all made in
arrears and the gold price always recovered within a few weeks of the
announcements. In other words, the actual Central Bank sales, themselves,
did not affect the market. That is also exactly what we saw on Thursday:
a comment by the British Chancellor of the Exchequer caused a speculative
sell-off in gold -- without an ounce of IMF gold being sold. I expect
the gold price will recover within a few weeks, unless something else,
like a rally in the US dollar, occurs.
Another thing to keep in mind is that the G7 is split over
how to deal with the debt of poor countries. To revalue or sell the IMF’s
gold will require an 85 percent majority vote. The United States alone
has a 17 percent vote, and could therefore block the IMF from selling
its gold.
Given that the IMF needs an 85 percent majority to sell
its gold, that actual gold sales would hurt the same countries (gold producers)
the IMF is trying to help, and that more benign off-market transactions
are also a way to help those countries, I doubt that we are going to see
massive IMF gold liquidations in the near future.
What we are likely to see is a replay of the 1990s when
Central Bank gold sales were attracting a lot of attention and were blamed
for the decline in the gold price while, in fact, the gold price was merely
mirroring the US dollar.
With the dollar now declining the gold price (in US dollars)
will continue its upward trend and nervousness about IMF gold sales is
likely to cause counter-trend corrections, which should turn out to be
good buying opportunities.
So I am not worried about this week’s decline
in the gold price.
Paul van Eeden
Paul van Eeden works primarily to find investments for his
own portfolio and shares his investment ideas with subscribers to his weekly
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